This study examines the use of performance based incentives for internal monitors (general counsel and chief internal auditor) and whether these incentives impair monitors' independence by aligning monitors' interests with the interests of those being monitored. We find evidence that incentives are greater when monitors' job duties contribute more to the firm's production function, other top managers receive greater incentives, and a firm has lower expected litigation risk. We also find evidence that incentive levels vary with demand for internal monitoring. We find no evidence that internal monitor incentives impair the monitoring function. Instead, our results suggest that adverse firm outcomes (e.g., regulatory enforcement actions and internal control material weakness disclosures) occur less frequently at firms that provide greater monitor incentives.
Introduction
Certain corporate officers, such as the firm general counsel (GC) and chief internal auditor (IA), are largely responsible for mitigating legal, compliance, and regulatory risk and enhancing general governance within the firm.
1 Because of the scope of their responsibilities, these internal firm monitors are often provided large compensation packages that are similar in composition to those granted to other top managers within the firm. What is particularly interesting about internal firm monitors' compensation, however, is that a substantial proportion of this compensation is derived from incentives tied to overall firm performance. Although agency theory might suggest that these incentives should align the internal monitors' interests with those of shareholders, there is some concern that these incentives instead align internal monitors' interests with those of the agents who are being monitored, thereby compromising the integrity of the monitors. Tyco General Counsel Mark Belnick's independence was impaired, in part, because he had received substantial performance based incentives (Oreskovic, 2004) . DeZoort et al. (2000) also report that internal auditor survey participants believe there are "a number of potential disadvantages associated with [incentive based compensation] based on overall company performance… [including] potential impairment of objectivity and independence". Barclift 1 The GC of a prominent industrial supply firm stated during a telephone interview that he serves as "the ultimate fiduciary in the company". Demott (2005) and the Institute of Internal Auditors (Position Statement, Sept 2004) note that the role of the internal auditor is to identify, evaluate, and mitigate enterprise risk. 2 Several recent papers suggest that performance based compensation may provide incentives for managers to extract personal rents (e.g., Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Bergstresser and Phillipon, 2006; and Jiang, Petroni, and Wang, 2009 ).
(2005) voices a similar concern and suggests that GC compensation contracts should not contain contingent payouts as function of firm performance, since performance based incentives in general, and equity-based compensation in particular, are thought to impair a GC's ability to "rein in corporate misconduct". The purpose of this study is to provide insight into the choice of performance based incentives for the GC and IA and assess whether these incentives enhance or impair monitoring incentives.
In this study, we utilize proprietary and public data that provide details about the incentive compensation contracts of the GC and the IA to examine why firms choose to grant performance based incentives to internal monitors. More importantly, we also examine the impact these incentives have on either alleviating or exacerbating agency problems within the firm. We draw inferences regarding the implications of compensating internal monitors with performance based incentives using a propensity score matched pair research design, which helps address econometric issues related to the endogenous design of incentive compensation contracts.
We find that internal monitors receive greater incentives when their job duties contribute more to the firm's production function. Internal monitors also receive greater incentives when they are more highly ranked within the firm and when the firm's CEO receives greater incentives, consistent with standardization in compensation contracts within the executive suite.
In addition, monitors receive lower incentives at firms with greater ex ante litigation risk, consistent with risk averse monitors demanding less risky compensation when their human capital is more at risk. Finally, we find some evidence that incentive levels vary as a function of the demand for internal monitoring.
To better understand the implications of internal monitor incentives, we next examine the association between internal monitor incentive levels and the frequency of adverse firm outcomes, which we use to proxy for unresolved agency problems within the firm. After matching monitors on observable characteristics of their contracting environments using a propensity score approach, we find a lower frequency of adverse outcomes (e.g., regulatory enforcement actions and internal control material weakness disclosures) at firms that provide their monitors with greater performance based incentives. These results are consistent across a variety of alternative measures of incentives and outcomes and appear robust in sensitivity analyses which assess the impact of omitted variable bias.
Overall, our results support the notion that performance based incentives enhance the internal monitoring function, perhaps by providing incentives for better monitoring effort or by facilitating the selection of more talented monitors. These results may allay concerns raised in the economics and legal literatures regarding whether performance based incentives are an appropriate form of compensation for internal monitors. These results also provide new insights into the implications of providing management with incentive based compensation by focusing directly on the implications of providing incentives to corporate officers who are responsible for overall governance within the firm.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 of this discusses prior research and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and provides descriptive statistics for the primary variables. Section 4 discusses our methodological approach. Section 5 presents our primary empirical results and accompanying sensitivity analyses. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
Prior Literature and Research Hypotheses

Incentives of top management
There has been considerable research examining the implications of providing performance based incentives to the CEO on firm performance (e.g., Hanlon, Rajgopal, and Shevlin, 2003) and earnings management, financial reporting restatements, and accounting related enforcement actions (e.g., Burns and Kedia, 2006; Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2006; Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker, 2009 ). The basic research question in this work focuses on whether incentives alleviate or exacerbate agency problems that exist between shareholders and the CEO, or the senior management team.
A recent series of papers focuses on the incentives provided to Chief Financial Officers (CFOs), because CFOs are thought to have a more direct influence over the financial reporting environment than the CEO. Wang (2006) , Gore, Matsunaga, and Yeung (2007) , and Indjejikian and Matejka (2009) examine the determinants of CFO incentive compensation contracts and find that the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CFO incentives decreased following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). This decrease in sensitivity is consistent with SOX increasing the overall cost of misreporting, so high-powered incentives, which are viewed as a substitute mechanism, are no longer needed to align the incentives of the CFO. Similarly, Jiang, Petroni, and Wang (2009) find a higher level of earnings management at firms that provide greater levels of CFO incentives, after controlling for CEO incentives levels. Despite extensive prior research, the evidence linking incentives to firm outcomes is very mixed. 
Incentives of monitors
3 Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2009) provide a more complete review of the mixed findings of this research and a discussion of the possible causes.
Prior research also examines the implications of providing incentives to monitoring agents by generally focusing on agents who are external to the operational management of the firm, but are responsible for overseeing managers' actions (e.g., outside directors). For example, Yermack (2004) examines the level of incentives provided to outside directors at Fortune 500 firms. He reports that these directors receive performance based incentives that are much lower in magnitude than those provided to top management. He also reports that the level of outside directors' incentives, like those of top management, is increasing in tenure, firm growth opportunities, and firm cash constraints and decreasing in firm leverage, which proxies for the agency costs of debt. Ryan and Wiggins (2004) examine the degree to which outside director "bargaining" power over the CEO determines the level of equity incentives provided to the board. The authors assume that equity-based compensation provides stronger incentives to monitor top management's actions and report that firms with fewer independent directors have lower equity-to-cash pay ratios for board member compensation.
4
Other studies in this area examine the implications of incentives on the board's monitoring performance. Along these lines, Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2002) model the role of compensation contracts in inducing monitoring by the board of directors. They find that directors require incentives to induce them to expend personally costly effort acquiring information which increases the precision of their monitoring efforts. However, empirical tests regarding the degree to which director incentives affect monitoring are, at best, indirect. For example, Feng, Ghosh, and Sirmans (2007) examine the relation between director incentives and firm performance in a small sample of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). They find that 4 In a similar vein, Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2009) examine the degree to which audit committee board member total compensation is associated with demands for better monitoring of the financial reporting process. Although they find evidence that audit committee member compensation is higher when there are greater monitoring demands (e.g., after Sarbanes-Oxley), they do not test whether monitoring itself appears to improve after providing increased compensation levels.
higher returns accrue to REITs that provide greater equity based compensation to board members. Becher, Campbell, and Frye (2005) find a positive relation between equity based compensation for board members and subsequent accounting performance in banks. Similarly, Cordeiro, Veliyath, and Romal (2007) find a positive relation between equity based compensation for directors and firm performance when there are high investment opportunities and weak external monitoring. Finally, Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) find that "excess" director (and CEO) compensation exhibits a negative relation with subsequent firm performance.
These studies suggest that director incentives have, at best, a modest association with firm performance and presumably monitoring effort.
5
There is little prior research that directly examines the determinants or implications of providing incentives to internal monitors. The closest study to ours is Chen, Chung, and Wynn (2009) which examines a sample of 273 NYSE firms that responded to a survey regarding whether the chief internal auditor receives incentive-based compensation. Their results suggest that external auditors charge higher audit fees at firms that provide their internal auditor One possible explanation for these results is that the low incentive levels provided to external monitors, such as outside directors, may not be substantial enough to influence their monitoring effort. Another possible explanation is that external monitors such as outside directors are not engaged in active monitoring on a day-to-day basis, so the impact of incentives on monitoring effort (if it exists) may be difficult to detect empirically.
5 Related studies exist that examine the implications of auditor compensation on audit or financial statement quality. For example, Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) provide evidence that the quality of auditor monitoring may be compromised by the degree to which firms compensate auditors for non-audit related services. This evidence has been challenged, however, by other research (e.g., Larcker and Richardson, 2004; DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam, 2002 
Sample and Descriptive Statistics
We obtain some of our data for internal monitor incentives from a proprietary database provided by a large human resources consulting firm. These data cover the calendar years 2002 to 2005 and are obtained through a detailed annual survey conducted by the consulting firm. The proprietary data includes information about the major components of executive compensation for many executive positions. We also obtain data for incentives measure from Equilar Inc., which collects publicly reported compensation data from approximately 4,000 firms' proxy statements (DEF14A). Firms are only required to report compensation and stock and option holdings data for the five highest paid employees. We are only able to obtain data for GCs when they are very highly compensated. As might be expected given the task of the internal auditor, we do not find any observations for the IA in public filings.
We compute three different incentive measures for the GC and IA executives.
GCCompMix is the ratio of the GC's contingent compensation (i.e., the sum of the annual bonus, and the grant date values of restricted stock, stock option, and equity-based long-term incentive plan grants) to total compensation. GCPortDelta is the (risk-neutral) dollar change in the GC's equity portfolio value for a 1% change in the firm's stock price (Core and Guay, 2002 IntAudCompMix is the ratio of the chief internal auditor's contingent compensation to total compensation. We do not have a portfolio delta measure for the IA because this executive is not listed in the proxy statement and, consequently, we do not have information about their stock and option portfolio holdings. The compensation mix variables are computed from our proprietary data and the portfolio delta variable is computed from public data. Table 1 reports the industry composition of the GCCompMix sample relative to all firms in Compustat during the same period. Industries are defined using the classification system outlined in Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1998) . Relative to the full Compustat sample, our sample of firm years includes a relatively greater proportion of firms from Food, Textiles and Chemicals, and a relatively smaller proportion of firms from Financial Services. In general, the distribution of firms across industries in our primary sample does not appear to differ materially from that of the general Compustat population.
Sample descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2 . The mean (median) market capitalization for our largest sample is $18,780 ($6,740) million which indicates that these firms are relatively large. Firms in our sample provide their GCs and internal auditors with substantial total compensation and a large proportion of this compensation is tied to overall firm performance. Specifically, the mean total compensation paid to the GC (IA) is $2,459,000
($996,000). On average, 74.5% (67.0%) of this total compensation is contingent on firm performance. In addition, the mean (median) portfolio delta for the GCs in the sample for which we have compensation and holdings data is $250,000 ($129,000). This sensitivity to firm performance appears economically significant even if it is relatively smaller in magnitude than the mean (median) portfolio delta for CEOs in the sample of $1,857,000 ($785,000). Log(MVE)) = 0.64, respectively). These relatively high correlations highlight the need to control for the CEO incentives when attempting to attribute performance consequences to lower level executives (i.e., there is an obvious identification problem).
Since unresolved agency problems are not directly observable, we proxy for the existence of these problems with a set of adverse firm outcomes that are presumably a result of inappropriate actions by managers. Class action lawsuit litigation damage periods (i.e., where LitDmgYr = 1) are those years in which a class action plaintiff alleges that the firm engaged in improper activity that led to the class action lawsuit filing. These data are obtained from Woodruff Sawyer & Co., a directors and officers liability insurance firm, which comprehensively collects class action data from public filings. We designate as a class action damage period any year during which a portion of the calendar year falls between the class action damage period start date and the earlier of the class action damage period end date or the class action suit filing date. Class action suit filing years (i.e., where SuitYr = 1) are those years in which the firm is formally named in a class action proceeding. We designate a class action filing year for the calendar year in which plaintiffs record their formal complaint. We code an AAER incident as the first fiscal year in which the SEC alleges that accounting manipulation occurred, as detailed in the Enforcement Release.
8 Revenue recognition restatements may result from changes in GAAP or GAAP enforcement (e.g., Staff Accounting Bulletin 101). We classify these restatements as "manipulation," since many GAAP enforcement changes resulted from regulatory perception that revenue was being misreported. For sensitivity, we also restrict our restatement sample to the subsample of Glass-Lewis restatements that note revenue recognition, expense recognition, or concerns over reserves and allowances (Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz, 2004) and also note a material weakness, a late filing, an auditor change, or a restatement via 8-K filing. Results for this restricted restatement sample are qualitatively similar to our reported results. 9 We define an enforcement action allegation period as the period that precedes the AAER filing date during which the SEC alleges that accounting manipulation had occurred.
240.13b2-2 [misrepresentation]
. 10 It includes enforcement actions such as class action lawsuits against the firm and its officers, criminal proceedings against the firm and its officers, and regulatory or oversight actions such as AAERs and deregistrations. Although elements of this dataset overlap with some of our other outcome measures, this dataset is broader in scope and thus captures other potential adverse outcomes that are likely within the purview of an internal monitor's job responsibility. We designate an enforcement action year when any portion of the calendar year falls between the enforcement period start date and the enforcement period end date.
11
Finally, material weakness report years (i.e., where MwYr = 1) are those years in which the auditor or firm management identifies and reports a material weakness in internal controls.
Material weakness disclosure data begins with data collected by Doyle, Ge, and McVay (2007) and is augmented with data from Audit Analytics. Table 3 Panel B reports Pearson correlation coefficients relating to our measures of adverse outcomes. As should be expected, our measures of adverse outcomes are positively correlated. For example, there is a high correlation between the incidence of a litigation damage period year and the filing of the actual class action lawsuit (ρ (LitDmgYr t , SuitYr t ) = 0.61) and the incidence of an accounting restatement (ρ (LitDmgYr t , RstmtYr t ) = 0.30). These correlations suggest that our proxies are capturing the unobservable construct related to unresolved agency concerns. 10 This data has been previous used by Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008a, b) . 11 The Karpoff, Martin, and Lee dataset defines the enforcement period start date as the first public date where there is an indication of misconduct. It is the earliest of the trigger date (date indicated in enforcement proceedings that precipitated regulatory or private action), the informal request date (date the firm announced an informal request for information by regulators), the investigation date (date the firm announced it was the target of a formal investigation or the date a subpoena was served), the Wells Notice date (date the firm received an SEC Wells Notice), the beginning date of regulatory enforcement or the date of a class action suit filing. The dataset defines the enforcement period end date as the latest of the violation beginning date (beginning date of the violation as indicated in the enforcement proceedings), the violation ending date, the class action settlement date, the ending of class action proceedings date, or the date of last regulatory enforcement proceeding.
Methodological Approach
Determinants of Internal Monitor Incentives
To understand the determinants of internal monitors' performance based incentive levels, and to estimate propensity scores for subsequent match pair analysis, we estimate the following specification: M&A is an indicator variable that equals one if an acquisition contributed to sales during the year (Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2006) and equals zero otherwise. CEOIncentives, computed using a similar method as GCPortDelta, is the natural logarithm of the portfolio delta of the firm's CEO.
ReportLvl is a rank variable provided within the proprietary dataset that indicates the corporate level to which the monitor reports for supervision. Lower values indicate a higher reporting rank.
t is a subscript denoting calendar compensation year and firm subscripts are not annotated for 14 PredLitRisk is estimated from the following annual cross-sectional logistic regression (adapted from Rogers and Stocken, 2005) : brevity. Robust standard errors are computed using two-way clustering by firm and year to control form time-series and cross-sectional correlation (Petersen, 2009; Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2010) .
If performance based incentives are effective at enhancing monitoring effort, then we expect internal monitors to receive more performance based incentives at firms that face higher monitoring demands. Alternatively, if performance based incentives are thought to misalign monitoring incentives, we expect internal monitors to receive lower (perhaps zero) performance based incentives at firms that face higher monitoring demands. Prior studies have used firm size and geographic diversity to proxy for firm complexity (e.g., Bushman et al., 2004; Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008 ), so we include Log(MVE) and NumGeoSegs to capture these two constructs.
More complex firms should also exhibit a greater demand for external auditing, so we include
Log(ExtAuditFees). GovMonFactor and InstitOwnPct to proxy for monitoring demands related
to outside shareholder information asymmetries. PredLitRisk is included to proxy for monitoring demand related to litigation exposure. Finally, Leverage and NewPublicDebt are included to proxy for monitoring demands related to creditor information asymmetries (e.g., Diamond, 1984; Fama, 1985) . We do not predict the sign of the relationship between Incentives and the set of monitoring demand variables because ex ante it is not clear whether firms expect internal monitor incentives to enhance or misalign monitoring effort.
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If firms expect performance based incentives to enhance productive effort, we expect internal monitors to receive more performance based incentives when these agents play a more direct role in the firms' production function (Indjejikian and Matejka, 2009) . PctLawyers and M&A are included to proxy for the degree to which the internal monitor's job scope is related to 16 Since PredLitRisk also proxies for the firm's overall risk exposure, one might expect to see a negative relation with Incentives if firms remunerate risk-averse monitors with less risky pay when facing uncertain environments.
fundamental business operations.
17
CEOIncentives and ReportLvl are included to control for other factors (e.g., selection of employees on risk-aversion, talent, or reputation) related to the compensation contracting environment and scope of responsibility for the firm's top employees. For example, if firms tend to require (e.g., through target ownership) or grant uniform levels of incentives across top employees or hire senior management teams with similar levels of risk-aversion and/or talent then we expect a positive (negative) association between Incentives and CEOIncentives (ReportLvl). It is also important to control for CEOIncentives in our study since it allows us to separately identify the impact of the monitor's incentives on adverse firm outcomes incremental to the effect of CEO incentives.
If firms provide more performance based incentives when their internal monitors play a more direct role in business operations, then we should observe a positive relation between incentive levels and PctLawyers and M&A.
Effects of Internal Monitor Incentives
To understand the economic implications of providing performance based incentives to internal monitors, we utilize a propensity score matched pair research design that consists of the following steps (e.g., Rosenbaum, 2002; Imbens, 2000) . First, we model the determinants of the level of performance based incentives provided to internal monitors using equation (1). The fitted values from equation (1) serve as our propensity scores. Second, using the approach outlined in Lu et al. (2001) , we form matched pairs of observations with the smallest propensity score difference (i.e., the most similar observed contracting environments) but the greatest difference in actual incentives (i.e., the most dissimilar incentive compensation contracts for their internal monitors). We form matched pairs by identifying the pairings that result in 17 PctLawyers is excluded in the IntAudCompMix regression since there is no reason to suspect that law department size is a determinant of internal auditor compensation.
observations with the smallest propensity-score differences (i.e., the most similar observed contracting environments) but the greatest difference in actual incentives (i.e., the most dissimilar contracts). Third, we examine the covariate balance between the matched pairs (i.e., monitors with high and low incentives) to ensure that the observable variables are balanced across the two subsamples, which helps to mitigate overt bias. 18 Fourth, we examine the relationship between monitor incentives and adverse outcomes by assessing whether the frequency of these outcomes is significantly different between the high and low incentives groups. Fifth, we assess the sensitivity of any significant differences to potential hidden bias by relaxing the assumption that matched observations have an equal probability of receiving a certain level of incentives conditional on the observable features of the contracting environment (Rosenbaum, 2002) . This assessment enables us to quantify the potential impact of confounding variables on the observed statistical association between the level of monitor incentives and the outcome of interest. Finally, in order to ensure that our matched pair results are robust to potentially incomplete controls through matching, we estimate a post-matching logistic regression that accounts for any remaining local covariate imbalance that remains after matching (Ho et al., 2007) .
Results
Determinants of monitor incentives
Results from estimating equation (1) are reported in Table 4 . We first consider whether there is consistent evidence with regard to our proxies for monitoring demands. Recall that predicted coefficients for our monitoring demand proxies rely both on the degree to which these proxies capture monitoring demand and whether firms believe incentives will enhance or impair monitoring efforts conditional on monitoring demand.
We find evidence of a positive relation between Incentives and our proxies for firm complexity. For example, the coefficients for NumGeoSegs and Log(MVE) when Incentives = GCCompMix are 0.008 (t-statistic = 4.82) and 0.050 (t-statistic = 4.86), respectively. If these proxies capture greater monitoring demand relating to firm complexity, then this evidence is consistent with firms expecting internal monitors' incentives to enhance their monitoring effort.
We find some evidence of a negative relation between Incentives and both however, since the association between Incentives and PredLitRisk will also be affected by compensation contracting demands. Since it is costly to impose compensation risk on a riskaverse agent, firms may choose to provide lower incentive compensation to internal monitors when these monitors are operating in environments with greater legal uncertainty. The negative coefficient for PredLitRisk is also consistent with this alternative inference. Table 4 also provides some evidence that firms provide more performance based incentives when the internal monitor has a more direct role in the firm production function. For example, the coefficient for PctLawyers when Incentives = GCCompMix is 7.356 (t-statistic = 3.11). There is also some evidence that that internal monitors receive greater incentives when CEO incentives are high and when the internal monitor is of higher rank. Specifically, the coefficients for CEOIncentives and ReportLvl when Incentives = GCCompMix are 0.014 (tstatistic = 1.99) and −0.034 (t-statistic = −3.07), respectively. This indicates that there is a systematic component of firms' incentive compensation plans across senior executives. The relatively high (partial) correlation between the incentives of the internal monitors and the CEO after controlling for other features of the contracting environment (e.g., firm size and industry) also highlights why it is important to control for the firm-specific component of incentives in order to accurately identify the effect of internal monitors' incentives separate from those of the CEO. Table 5 reports results regarding covariate balance across the matched pairs of treatment (i.e., executives with relatively "high" incentives) and control (i.e., executives with relatively "low" incentives) observations. For all three incentives measures, Table 5 provides no evidence that the characteristics of the underlying contracting environments differ either statistically or economically across the treatment and control groups. The first row of each panel of Table 5 also indicates that the propensity score matching algorithm successfully retains variation in the level of incentives across the matched samples. Retaining variation in the distributions of treatment variables is an important research design element since it helps to ensure that our subsequent tests of differences in adverse outcomes across the treatment and control groups are powerful (see Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker, 2009 for a discussion). the significance of the discordant pairs. A pair of observations is said to be "concordant" if the subjects experience the same outcome (e.g., there is no adverse outcome at either firm) and "discordant" if they have experience different outcomes (i.e., one firm experiences an adverse outcome, but the other firm does now). McNemar's (1947) statistic is a special case of a sign-score statistic that takes the general form T = t(Z,r) = Since there is ambiguity regarding when incentives might induce an effect on adverse outcomes, we present results for both contemporaneous and one year ahead outcomes. If (Liddell, 1983) . Our inferences are unchanged when this exact test is used for evaluating the results in Table  6. incentives enhance monitoring because they better align the internal monitors' interests with those of shareholders, we should observe either a lower frequency of adverse outcomes or no difference across the firms that supply these agents with high and low levels of performance based incentives.
InstitOwnerPct and Log(ExtAudFees
Matched pair covariate balance
Internal monitor incentives and the frequency of adverse firm outcomes
The results in Table 6 indicate that there are fewer instances of adverse outcomes at firms that provide greater incentives to internal monitors. These results suggest that performance based incentives either align the interests of monitors with the interests of shareholders or enable firms to select better monitors. For example, Table 6 
Sensitivity to hidden bias
We assess the sensitivity of statistically significant results by estimating the boundary Γ values for cases in which the McNemar's test p-values exceed 0.10 (two-tailed). Specifically, in the cases in which there is a statistically significant difference between the outcomes of the treatment and control groups, we calculate the value of Γ (or the odds ratio) at which a significance level of 0.10 would be obtained. Rosenbaum (2002, section 4.3 .2) illustrates how one can obtain threshold Γ estimates for the McNemar's test. Conceptually, the McNemar's test statistic relies on the chi-square distribution which is a function of the binomial distribution in the case where there are only two cells (i.e., treatment and control). The default probability of treatment (p) vs. control (1-p) for the binomial distribution is 0.5. To obtain threshold Γ estimates, one can iterate through alternative values of p until the resulting McNemar's test p-value converges to a predetermined insignificance level (e.g., 0.10, two-tail, for this study).
These Γ values allow us to quantify the amount of hidden bias necessary to invalidate the statistical significance that results from the assumption that two observations with identical propensity scores have an equal probability of receiving the treatment (i.e., high incentives).
We find that, in cases in which a statistically significant relationship is observed, a Γ value of between 1.046 and 2.287 is needed to reduce the statistical significance of the results to a 10% level (two-tail). Since no objective benchmark exists to determine whether these values for Γ are "large" or "small", we consider the economic setting and the integrity of our propensity score estimation to draw an inference regarding the likelihood that reported results are affected by omitted variable bias. 21 In our setting it seems unlikely that there exists some omitted factor(s) that would create an environment where one internal monitor would be approximately 1.5 times more likely to obtain greater levels of incentives than another, after matching on CEO incentives, firm size, year, governance, ex ante firm legal risk, and the other variables included in the propensity score model. 
Sensitivity to potentially incomplete controls through matching
Thus, several results are likely to be robust to hidden bias.
Inferences from Table 6 also rely on the assumption that propensity score matching effectively controls for the effects of the observable variables on the outcome of interest. Ho et al. (2007) suggest that this might not always be the case and propose that researchers use propensity score matching as a "preprocessing step", and then include the variables from the propensity score model in a parametric estimation (e.g., logistic regression for binary outcomes)
in the second step. Ho et al. (2007) note that "except in the extraordinary case where matching is exact, common parametric procedures have the potential to greatly improve causal inferences 21 The designation of "small" vs. "large" is subjective and depends on the reader's prior beliefs as to the degree of endogenous selection on unobservable factors (e.g., risk-aversion, talent, and/or productivity) in contracting. Larger values of Γ, however, provide greater confidence that results are robust to hidden bias. Smaller values of Γ indicate that results are sensitive to hidden bias, thereby confounding inferences from the analysis. 22 However, it does appear that results with a Γ = 1.046 (Table 6 , Panel C) are appropriately considered to be fragile.
even after matching". The benefit of this approach is that pre-matching balances the variables over much of their support and any remaining "local" imbalance is controlled through parametric estimation. 23 Following Ho et al. (2007) , we assess the sensitivity of our results by estimating logistic regressions of outcomes as a function of monitor incentives and the set of control variables outlined in equation (1) on a pre-matched sample.
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Panel A (Panel B) of Table 7 reports results of the association between the three measures of incentives and the likelihood of a contemporaneous (one year ahead) adverse outcome. 25 Coefficient estimates for control variables are not reported for brevity. Consistent with results reported in Table 6 , we find that the probability of an adverse firm outcome is decreasing in the level of internal monitor incentives.
Conclusion
An important unresolved question is whether it is desirable for firms to provide internal monitors with substantial performance based incentives. Although incentives may motivate monitors to provide valuable effort, the same incentives may also impair the efficacy of their monitoring activities. We examine the factors that are associated with the level of internal monitor incentives and the implications of this choice for alleviating or exacerbating agency problems within the firm.
Our evidence suggests that the GC and IA are provided greater incentives when their job duties contribute more to the firm's production function. We also find evidence consistent with 23 Although this regression technique requires assumptions about the correct parametric relationship (e.g., linearity) between the outcome and the control variables, Ho et al. (2007) note that the parametric relational assumption is more likely to be descriptive over the smaller post-matching range rather than over the entire support of the variable (which is implicit without matching). 24 Since pre-matching achieves a sufficient degree of covariate balance, we do not have to eliminate any matched pairs from the sample. Accordingly, in this case, the procedure of Ho et al. (2007) is identical to estimating a logistic regression using the full sample. 25 Some results are not provided in Table 7 because estimation convergence did not occur due to the relatively low frequency of adverse outcomes.
the existence of a systematic structure to the compensation program across senior executives. We also find that monitors receive lower incentives at firms with greater ex ante litigation risk, consistent with risk averse monitors demanding less performance based compensation when the business environment is risky. Finally, we find some evidence that internal monitors' incentives are a function of the demand for internal monitoring.
More importantly, our evidence suggests that there is a lower frequency of adverse outcomes at firms that provide their internal monitors with greater performance based incentives.
This suggests that incentives align the monitor's interests with the interests of shareholders or allow shareholders to select better monitors. Our results are consistent across alternative measures of internal monitor incentives and a number of outcome variables that have been used by prior research to proxy for the existence of unresolved agency problems.
As is the case with other related studies that examine the implications of incentive compensation, it is difficult to draw causal inferences because compensation contracts undoubtedly result from an endogenous choice by the board of directors (acting on behalf of shareholders). Although, our results appear to be reasonably robust to correlated omitted variables (or hidden bias), we cannot conclusively rule out the possibility that our results are affected by this econometric concern. Nevertheless, our results suggest that performance based incentives do not impair the monitoring ability of the general counsel or the chief internal auditor. LitDmgYr, SuitYr, RstmtYr, AAERYr, EnfmntYr, and MWYr are indicator variables that equal one if the firm year falls within a litigation damage period, law suit filing period, accounting restatement period, AAER period, general enforcement period, or material weakness report period, respectively. All variables equal zero otherwise. GCCompMix is the ratio of the GC's contingent compensation (i.e., the sum or the annual bonus, restricted stock, stock option, and equity-based long-term incentive plan grants) to total compensation. GCPortDelta is the (risk-neutral) dollar change in the GC's equity portfolio value for a 1% change in the firm's stock price (Core and Guay, 2002) . GCTotalComp is the dollar value of total compensation provided to the GC during the year. IntAudCompMix is the ratio of the chief internal auditor's contingent compensation (i.e., the sum or the annual bonus, restricted stock, stock option, and equity-based long-term incentive plan grants) to total compensation. IntAudTotalComp is the dollar value of total compensation provided to the chief internal auditor during the year. PctLawyers is the ratio of the number of legal department employees to total firm employees. NewPublicDebt is a dichotomous variable that equals one if SDC indicates the firm issued new public debt during the calendar year and equals zero otherwise. MVE is the beginning market value of equity. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to book value of assets. PctOutsiders is the ratio of outside directors to total directors as provided by Equilar. OutsideChmn is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the chairman of the board of directors is classified as an outsider by Equilar and is zero otherwise. PctBusyDirs is the fraction of outside directors who serve simultaneously on at least two boards to total directors. NumDirs is the number of directors on the board. NumBdMeetings is the number of board meetings in the calendar year as provided by Equilar. NumGeoSegments is the beginning of year number of geographic segments in which the firm operates as provided by Compustat. PredLitRisk is the firm's expected class action litigation probability estimated in the year prior to the GC compensation year. M&A is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the firm engaged in an acquisition during the year, and is zero otherwise. M&A is specifically set equal to one if an acquisition contributed to sales during the year (Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2006) . InstitOwnerPct is the percentage of outstanding shares designated as institutionally owned by CDA/Spectrum. ExtAudFees is the amount of fees paid to external auditors for the fiscal year as reported in Audit Analytics. ReportLvl is a rank variable that indicates the corporate level to which the monitor reports for supervision. Lower values indicate a higher reporting rank (e.g., ReportLvl = 1 indicates supervision by the board of directors or CEO). CEOIncentives is the portfolio delta computed for the firm's CEO. t is a subscript denoting calendar compensation year. GCCompMix is the ratio of the GC's contingent compensation (i.e., the sum of the annual bonus, and the grant date values of restricted stock, stock option, and equity-based long-term incentive plan grants) to total compensation. GCPortDelta is the (risk-neutral) dollar change in the GC's equity portfolio value for a 1% change in the firm's stock price (Core and Guay, 2002) . IntAudCompMix is the ratio of the internal auditor's contingent compensation (i.e., the sum of the annual bonus, and the grant date values of restricted stock, stock option, and equity-based long-term incentive plan grants) to total compensation. PctLawyers is the ratio of the number of legal department employees to total firm employees. NumGeoSegs is the beginning of year number of geographic segments in which the firm operates as provided by Compustat.
M&A is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm engaged in an acquisition during the year and equals zero otherwise. Log(MVE) is the natural logarithm of market value of equity at the beginning of the year. GovMonFactor is a governance monitoring demand factor derived through principal components analysis (with orthogonal rotation) of a set of governance variables provided by Equilar: OutsideChmn, an indicator variable that equals one if the Chairman of the Board of Directors is classified as an outsider and equals zero otherwise; PctOutsiders, the ratio of outside directors to total directors; PctBusyDirs, the fraction of outside directors who serve simultaneously on at least two boards; NumDirs, the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board; and NumBdMeeting, the number of board meetings in the calendar year. InstitOwnerPct is the percentage of outstanding shares designated as institutionally owned by CDA/Spectrum. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to book value of assets. NewPublicDebt is an indicator variable that equals one if Securities Data Corporation (SDC) indicates the firm issued new public debt during the calendar year and equals zero otherwise. CEOIncentives is the natural logarithm of the portfolio delta computed for the firm's CEO. PredLitRisk is the firm's expected class action litigation probability estimated in the year prior to the GC compensation year. t is a subscript denoting calendar compensation year. ExtAudFees is the amount of fees paid to external auditors for the fiscal year as reported in Audit Analytics. ReportLvl is a rank variable that indicates the corporate level to which the monitor reports for supervision. Lower values indicate a higher reporting rank (e.g., ReportLvl = 1 indicates supervision by the board of directors or CEO). GCCompMix is the ratio of the GC's contingent compensation (i.e., the sum of the annual bonus, and the grant date values of restricted stock, stock option, and equity-based longterm incentive plan grants) to total compensation. GCPortDelta is the (risk-neutral) dollar change in the GC's equity portfolio value for a 1% change in the firm's stock price (Core and Guay, 2002) . IntAudCompMix is the ratio of the internal auditor's contingent compensation (i.e., the sum of the annual bonus, and the grant date values of restricted stock, stock option, and equity-based long-term incentive plan grants) to total compensation. Log(MVE) is the natural logarithm of market value of equity at the beginning of the year.
GovMonFactor is a governance monitoring demand factor derived through principal components analysis (with orthogonal rotation) of a set of governance variables provided by Equilar: OutsideChmn, an indicator variable that equals one if the Chairman of the Board of Directors is classified as an outsider and equals zero otherwise; PctOutsiders, the ratio of outside directors to total directors; PctBusyDirs, the fraction of outside directors who serve simultaneously on at least two boards; NumDirs, the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board; and NumBdMeeting, the number of board meetings in the calendar year. InstitOwnerPct is the percentage of outstanding shares designated as institutionally owned by CDA/Spectrum. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to book value of assets. NewPublicDebt is an indicator variable that equals one if Securities Data Corporation (SDC) indicates the firm issued new public debt during the calendar year and equals zero otherwise. ExtAudFees is the amount of fees paid to external auditors for the fiscal year as reported in Audit Analytics. PredLitRisk is the firm's expected class action litigation probability estimated in the year prior to the GC compensation year. PctLawyers is the ratio of the number of legal department employees to total firm employees. NumGeoSegs is the beginning of year number of geographic segments in which the firm operates as provided by Compustat. M&A is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm engaged in an acquisition during the year and equals zero otherwise. t is a subscript denoting calendar compensation year. CEOIncentives is the natural logarithm of the portfolio delta computed for the firm's CEO. ReportLvl is a rank variable that indicates the corporate level to which the monitor reports for supervision. Lower values indicate a higher reporting rank. t-statistics are adjusted for firm and year clusters (Gow et al., 2010) . GCCompMix is the ratio of the GC's contingent compensation (i.e., the sum of the annual bonus, and the grant date values of restricted stock, stock option, and equity-based long-term incentive plan grants) to total compensation. GCPortDelta is the (riskneutral) dollar change in the GC's equity portfolio value for a 1% change in the firm's stock price (Core and Guay, 2002) . IntAudCompMix is the ratio of the internal auditor's contingent compensation (i.e., the sum of the annual bonus, and the grant date values of restricted stock, stock option, and equity-based long-term incentive plan grants) to total compensation. PctLawyers is the ratio of the number of legal department employees to total firm employees. NumGeoSegs is the beginning of year number of geographic segments in which the firm operates as provided by Compustat. M&A is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm engaged in an acquisition during the year and equals zero otherwise. Log(MVE) is the natural logarithm of market value of equity at the beginning of the year. GovMonFactor is a governance monitoring demand factor derived through principal components analysis (with orthogonal rotation) of a set of governance variables provided by Equilar: OutsideChmn, an indicator variable that equals one if the Chairman of the Board of Directors is classified as an outsider and equals zero otherwise; PctOutsiders, the ratio of outside directors to total directors; PctBusyDirs, the fraction of outside directors who serve simultaneously on at least two boards; NumDirs, the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board; and NumBdMeeting, the number of board meetings in the calendar year. InstitOwnerPct is the percentage of outstanding shares designated as institutionally owned by CDA/Spectrum. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to book value of assets. NewPublicDebt is an indicator variable that equals one if Securities Data Corporation (SDC) indicates the firm issued new public debt during the calendar year and equals zero otherwise. CEOIncentives is the natural logarithm of the portfolio delta computed for the firm's CEO. PredLitRisk is the firm's expected class action litigation probability estimated in the year prior to the GC compensation year. t is a subscript denoting calendar compensation year. ExtAudFees is the amount of fees paid to external auditors for the fiscal year as reported in Audit Analytics. ReportLvl is a rank variable that indicates the corporate level to which the monitor reports for supervision. Lower values indicate a higher reporting rank (e.g., ReportLvl = 1 indicates supervision by the board of directors or CEO). 
